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AN ARCHETYPAL PHENOMENOLOGY OF SKHOLÉ
David Kennedy
Department of Educational Foundations
Montclair State University

Abstract. In this essay David Kennedy argues that children represent one vanguard of an emergent shift
in Western subjectivity, and that adult–child dialogue, especially in the context of schooling, is a key
locus for the epistemological change that implies. Following Herbert Marcuse’s invocation of a “new
sensibility,” Kennedy argues that the evolutionary phenomenon of neoteny — the long formative period
of human childhood and the paedomorphic character of humans across the life cycle — makes of the
adult–child collective of school a primary site for the reconstruction of belief. After exploring child–adult
dialogue more broadly as a form of dialectical interaction between what John Dewey called “impulse”
and “habit,” Kennedy identifies three key dimensions of dialogic schooling, all of which are grounded in
a fourth: the form of dialogical group discourse called community of philosophical inquiry (CPI), which
is based on the problematization and reconstruction of concepts through critical argumentation. As a
discourse model, CPI grounds practice in all of the dialogic school’s emergent curricular spaces, whether
science or mathematics, whether literature, art, or philosophy. Second, CPI opens a functional space for
shared decision making and collaborative governance, making of school an exemplary model of direct
democracy. Finally, CPI as a site for the critical interrogation of concepts encountered in the curriculum
(such as “alive,” “justice,” “system,” and “biosphere”) and as a site for democratic governance leads
naturally to expression in activist projects that model an emergent “new reality principle” through
concrete solutions to practical problems on local and global levels.

School as Archetype
In this essay, I aim to offer one normative definition of “school” as a form
of intentional community in which certain social, psychological, and political
possibilities are present in the purposeful interaction between youth and age that
act as agents of cumulative cultural evolution, or “cultural ratcheting.”1 I argue
that school, when organized as a purposeful site of intergenerational dialogue or
“meeting” in the strong sense, opens spaces for the ongoing reconstruction of
habit and belief that are promised both in the long period of neuronal development
offered by human childhood, or “neoteny”; and by the related phenomenon of
“paedomorphism,” or the extent to which Homo sapiens, in comparison with
its forebears, is marked throughout the life cycle by both physiological and
psychological characteristics that are childlike.2 But I also argue that, while
(1) political democratization and class mobility — the rise, specifically, of a
new class of “free men” in fifth-century BC Athens that challenged aristocratic
hegemony3 — first created a social space for the emergence of this form of
adult–child collective, (2) the school’s full potential as a transformative social and
cultural institution has only been realized through a widespread transformation of
1. Michael Tomasello, Why We Cooperate (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press 2009), xiii.
2. See David F. Bjorklund, “The Role of Immaturity in Human Development,” Psychological Bulletin
122, no. 2 (1997): 153–169.
3. James Bowen, The Ancient World, vol. 1 of A History of Western Education (New York: St. Martin’s
Press, 1981), chap. 4.
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child-rearing modes that grew out of a new understanding of the child as agent and
interlocutor that has emerged in the West over the last two centuries. I contend,
in other words, that a particular view of childhood (and hence of individual
children), embodied in a “psychogenic mode” and characteristic of a particular
“psychoclass”4 or type of social character, is a critical element in cultural and
political evolution to the extent that this evolution depends upon a certain form of
school-based education; and that schooling understood as dialogue and emergence
rather than monologue and “formation” is its basic template, or archetype.
One searches the ancient educational records in vain for even a hint of a
dialogical approach to childhood and schooling, save for an opinion expressed
offhand here or there — by Augustine, for example, or Isocrates — that younger
children should be allowed to play or should not be physically punished, views
that likely carried little weight among the general population. From their earliest
appearance in Egyptian and Mesopotamian records onward, the Near Eastern
and Western traditions reveal a consistent picture of institutionalized education
in the service of class domination and the reification of hegemonic knowledge
regimes (with these, in turn, serving to bolster the state, religion, and a planned
economy), and an understanding of children as raw material for the reproduction
of this centralized apparatus.5 As such, the rather dramatic obscuration in our
contemporary public, universal education system of the distinction between what
we commonly mean by “training” and what we mean by “education” represents
a regression to a previous state. Yet, the very fact that so many of us recognize
the current trend as a violation of our deeper values suggests that it represents a
historical forgetting of at least two centuries of educational evolution based on
a principle of mutuality and interlocution between adults and children, and on
the notion, however partially realized, of school as a force for liberatory social
reconstruction.
We could, taking a page from humanist–organismic developmental psychology, interpret this regression as one moment in a historical dialectic — a case
of evolutionary reculer pour mieux sauter: dialogic education will return, better
articulated and stronger! This optimism is belied by the historical record, however.
School as a site for intergenerational dialogue, student agency, free inquiry, and cultural and social transformation through direct democratic practice — the school,
that is, as a neotenic institution in the service of emancipatory personal, social,
and political ideals and impulses — has, at least since the emergence throughout
4. Lloyd deMause, ed., The History of Childhood (New York: Harper, 1974).
5. Bowen, The Ancient World, chaps. 1 and 2.
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the nineteenth century of postrevolutionary ideals of liberation and social reconstruction, been the seed under the snow of universal, compulsory, state-mandated
and controlled education-as-social-reproduction, or training. It is, as the eminent
anarcho-socialist and martyr Gustav Landauer put it, a prefiguration, an evolutionary laboratory, a site for the growth of a new society “under the shell of the
old.”6
Whatever the possibilities hidden in the present historical moment, the current hegemonic onslaught of a narrowly conceived corporate–capitalist model of
education — “data-driven” and measurement-obsessed — presents an opportunity
to think more clearly and at a deeper level about just what has been snowed under
by this epochal crackdown and to identify some universal deep-structural characteristics of what Jan Masschelein and Maarten Simons have called the “form
of gathering and actions” that characterizes a school based on dialogue, choice,
inquiry, and direct democratic practice.7 This form of gathering, I argue, is an
archetype in the broad sense of the term: a species-wide expression of the evolutionary possibilities inherent in a dialogical as opposed to a monological relationship between youth and age. Its manifestations are, of course, socioeconomically and ideologically marked as well as historically emergent, but as a social
life form it is always a present possibility. If it is an archetype, it was always
there as a species potential, but archetypes are expressed in cultural and historical contexts, and are realized as cultural constructs. This gathering, while it is
clearly a cultural/historical artifact, is also archetypal because it has some universal dimensions that can be identified phenomenologically. Other structures of
adult–child interaction can embody it — a family, or a variety of informal educational settings — but, I will argue, its expression in the form of the adult–child
collective that we call “school” expresses it most powerfully (at least in the present
era) precisely because it is an intentional community that is consciously dedicated to open inquiry, to an ideal speech situation, and to the “cultural ratcheting”
implicit in John Dewey’s pragmatic notion of the ongoing reconstruction of habit
through its dialogical encounter with impulse.8 This makes of it a place apart — an
educational counterculture that interrupts the demands of “productivity,” “development,” “growth,” “advance,” “preparation,” and “training” through which the
state, the economy, and the mass media act to colonize the younger generation;
and it does so in the long-term interest of social, cultural, economic, and political
transformation.
6. See Gustav Landauer, Revolution and Other Writings: A Political Reader, ed. and trans. Gabriel Kuhn
(Oakland, CA: PM Press, 2010): and Colin Ward, Anarchy in Action (London: Freedom Press, 1972). As a
prefiguration, it could also be seen as an evolutionary “sport” — a psychocultural possibility that appears
before its time and that is ephemeral because it has little support from the general culture in which it
emerges.
7. Jan Masschelein and Maarten Simons, In Defense of the School: A Public Issue, trans. Jack McMartin
(Leuven, Belgium: Education, Culture & Society, 2013).
8. For a clear exposition of this encounter, see John Dewey, Human Nature and Conduct: An Introduction to Social Psychology (New York: Heath, 1992).
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School as SKHOLÉ
We can in fact identify the first recorded appearance of this archetype in Western psychoculture quite specifically: it is seen during the fifth and fourth centuries
BC, with the rise of Athenian democracy and the emergent cultural ideal of skholé,
from which we have the original term “school.” It materialized at a moment of economic expansion associated with the widening of trade markets9 — a moment also
associated with the epistemological upheaval represented by the rhetorical struggle between the “philosophers” and the new knowledge-class of the “sophists” —
and acted as a wedge by way of which a new proto-bourgeois class began to break
open aristocratic social, economic, and political hegemony. Its manifestations in
the ancient Greek polis were highly restrictive (for example, slaves, women, and
noncitizens were excluded), but a central feature, whether defined by the philosophers (Socrates, Plato) or by the sophists (Protagoras, Isocrates), was one particular
notion that separates it from school understood as an ideological apparatus of the
state, a corporate entity, or a religious institution: the notion of a particular form
of temporality, or lived time. This notion is present in the etymology of the word
itself: the Greek term skholé is translated as “free time … that in which leisure is
employed,” and, even more originally, as “a holding back, a keeping clear”; this
notion is also evident in the Latin appropriation of the Greek, schola, defined
as “intermission of work, leisure for learning; … meeting place for teachers and
students.”10
The emphasis here is on a form of lived time that is different from workaday life — a time not driven by the economic imperative. Philosopher of childhood Walter Kohan — inspired by Heraclitus’s famous proverb, “Eternity is a
child playing at draughts; the kingdom is the child’s” — has identified this form
of time as aion, which is traditionally translated as “eternal” time or “eternal
present,” as opposed to kronos, which refers to linear time. In contrast to the
production-driven temporality of public compulsory schooling in its function as
a social mechanism dedicated to psychological, cultural, political, and economic
reproduction, the temporality of skholé is aionic and kairotic: it is a nondirectional or “timeless” time (aion), a time dedicated to emergence and timely manifestation, or epiphany (kairos).11 Skholé is a place set deliberately apart from
the demands of kronos; it is a “holding back” or “keeping clear” of the temporality characteristic of the office, factory, or bureau. It is a time in which
study — in its original sense of studium, “passion, eagerness, zeal, desire, spirit,
9. Mark Joyal, Iain McDougall, and J. C. Yardley, eds., Greek and Roman Education: A Sourcebook
(London: Routledge, 2009); Gerald L. Gutek, A History of the Western Educational Experience, 2nd ed.
(Prospect Heights, IL: Waveland Press, 1994); and Bowen, The Ancient World.
10. Online Etymology Dictionary, s.v. “school (n.1),” accessed November 14, 2017, https://www
.etymonline.com/word/school.
11. Walter Kohan, Philosophy and Childhood: Critical Perspectives and Affirmative Practices (New
York: Palgrave, 2014).
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pursuit”12 — is prioritized. On this account, skholé is a place of suspension of
the everyday, set apart in the service of inquiry and the emergence, through
the interaction of youth and age, of new forms of knowledge and of new social
habits; that is, it is a place in which natality is given its due as an evolutionary
force.
Whatever its originary virtues, classical Greek skholé was hindered in realizing the archetype of a form of gathering because of patriarchy, misogyny, class
domination, institutional slavery, and, as expressed in Aristotle’s philosophical
anthropology, the subspeciation of “woman” and “child,” neither of whom he considered to be fully capable of right willing, moral deliberation, or ethical judgment.
Aristotle’s child is an intemperate, transitional being — not yet a (male) adult, lacking the one functional characteristic that separates humans from other animals,
which is reason. Children are not self-controlled enough to deliberate for the good,
and they lack the right form of reason. On Aristotle’s account, the woman and the
slave will never be quite human; the “free” male child is not quite human either,
but he will be.13 As such, Aristotle’s educational theory, in encountering the child
as prehuman Other, was confined to forcefully turning not-adults into adults
through behavioral conditioning — which is characteristic, as psychohistorian
Lloyd deMause has argued, of the “ambivalent,” the “intrusive,” and the “socializing” child-rearing modes, all of which are haunted to varying degrees by the adult
projection of the animalic onto the child. As such, Greek skholé was restricted
to “young men,” those who had already escaped from childhood. Education for
children happened at home as often as not, and the pedagogy of what schools there
were was characterized by copying, memorization, recitation, and strict discipline,
however “well rounded” this training was in its inclusion of music and poetry,
the arts, and physical training. Primary education was dedicated to producing a
prototypical subject — an ideal citizen of the patriarchal city-state, “harmoniously
balanced in body and mind” and steeped in the dominant discourses — through
a process of interpellation. As in all intrusive and, to a lesser extent, socializing
mode pedagogies, from the most violent to the most subtle behaviorism, the child
is trained in habits he is assumed not to have and to be incapable of acquiring
without forceful adult intervention, resulting in adult subjects whose habits,
to the extent that they have not been arrived at through the logic of their own
internal experience, are not their own; they are subjects rather than subjectivities,
types rather than singularities, shaped for the politics of aristocracy, oligarchy, and
tyranny.
12. For which see Tyson Lewis, On Study: Giorgio Agamben and Educational Potentiality (London:
Routledge, 2013).
13. For an analysis of the pejorative use of the word “child” by Athenian philosophers, see Vinicius
Vicenzi, “Childhood as a Weapon in the Struggle Between Rhetoric and Philosophy in Plato’s Gorgias,”
Childhood and Philosophy 6, no. 11 (2010): 21–39.

277

278

EDUCATIONAL THEORY

Volume 67

Number 3

2017

The movement of skholé, on the other hand, is disruptive and thus inherently “modern” in the generic sense of the word.14 It is closely associated with
democratic, emancipatory impulses insofar as the latter emphasize freedom, equality, individualism and self-expression, classlessness, opportunity, mobility, resistance to irrational authority, and pragmatic meliorism. Just as it first arose under
the influence of the grand but messy experiment of Athenian democracy, so it
would not reenter history with any force until the rise of more universal, nonexclusionary democratic aspirations in late-eighteenth- and nineteenth-century revolutionary Europe and America, which was also the historical moment at which
“child” came under revision as an ontological category. In its modern form,
skholé is an outgrowth and expression of a historical reconceptualization of the
adult–child binary as reflecting a difference of degree rather than of kind — a
process that social historians, historians of childhood, and psychohistorians have
traced through the past half century.15
Understood from a psychohistorical perspective, skholé has taken on a more
concrete historical form during the past two centuries as a result of the onset of
what deMause called the “empathic” or “helping” child-rearing mode, the ultimate product of a series of “closer approaches” between adult and child,16 which
has led to (1) a reconceptualization of the educational relationship as encounter
rather than formation, cooperation rather than domination, dialogue rather than
monologue; and (2) an understanding of school as a democratic, intentional community dedicated specifically to the emancipatory possibilities inherent in this
dialogical relationship between youth and age. Its historical emergence can be
broadly traced as beginning with Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s educational manifesto
Emile,17 at which moment the concept “child” may be said to have officially
entered — through its problematization — the discourses of Western modernity.
The new, aporetic child that Rousseau’s fictional character represents moves
forward through nineteenth-century romanticism and revolution into what we
call “progressive education,” including the traditions associated with Johann
Pestalozzi, Friedrich Froebel, Rudolph Steiner, Maria Montessori, Francis Parker,
14. In this sense, skholé is, whatever historical period we find it in, “modern” if we understand one
primary impulse of modernity to be the interruption and disruption of cultural epistemologies and forms
of life in the interest of an allegedly better future.
15. Norbert Elias, The Civilizing Process: State Formation and Civilization, trans. Edmund Jephcott
(Oxford: Blackwell, 1994); Philippe Aries, Centuries of Childhood: A Social History of Family Life,
trans. Robert Baldick (New York: Knopf, 1962); Lloyd deMause, ed., The History of Childhood (New
York: Harper, 1974); Lawrence Stone, The Family, Sex and Marriage in England, 1500–1800, abridged
ed. (New York: Harper, 1979); and David Kennedy, The Well of Being: Childhood, Subjectivity, and
Education (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2006).
16. DeMause, The History of Childhood. For a discussion of this historical process based on deMause’s
theory of the evolution of child-rearing modes, see Kennedy, The Well of Being.
17. Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Émile, trans. Alan Bloom (New York: Basic Books, 1979).
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John Dewey, and Margaret Naumberg;18 anarcho-socialist educational theory and
practice;19 Celestin Freinet and the Modern School Movement; and, in the last
hundred years, the “democratic” or left-libertarian school movement.20 The philosophy of childhood held by most of these pioneers and educational movements
no doubt spans a broad spectrum between the empathic mode and its forerunner
in the “socializing mode.” The latter is, in deMause’s formulation, implicit in
organismic, development stage theory, whether expressed in its brute form in
recapitulation theory or in the complexities of Jean Piaget’s constructivism, and
their learning theories as well.
Three dimensions of progressive theory and practice have been identified in
U.S. education in the first half of the twentieth century: the behaviorist “scientific management” or “social engineering” approach; the social reconstructionist
approach; and the child-centered, along with its related “whole child,” approach.21
The first has clearly prevailed in mainstream American educational practice. In
deMause’s formulation, it could be characterized as a hybrid of the intrusive and
socializing modes, or an “iron hand in a velvet glove.” That is, the social engineering approach recognizes the child as a lawfully developing organism undergoing the
process of adapting to its environment, and, in order to control this process and its
outcome, it manipulates either the child (intrusive) or the environment (socializing). Even what actual pedagogy we find in Rousseau may be so characterized. On
the other hand, the social reconstructionist approach foundered early on due to
the paradoxes and contradictions of political indoctrination. The child-centered
approach has clearly moved over into the empathic mode, but apart from its
psychoanalytic, art-oriented branch represented in Margaret Naumberg’s Walden
School and in the radical left Freudian “psychoanalytic pedagogy” movement in
1920s Vienna,22 its pervasive developmental focus still defuses its dialogical potential: “child” is understood in advance, and the concept of “developmentally appropriate” represents a warm but smothering blanket on the child–adult relation.
18. James Bowen, The Modern West, vol. 3 of A History of Western Education (New York: St. Martin’s
Press, 1981); and Gutek, A History of the Western Educational Experience.
19. Paul Avrich, The Modern School Movement: Anarchism and Education in the United States
(Oakland, CA: AK Press, 2006); Peter Marshall, Demanding the Impossible: A History of Anarchism
(Oakland, CA: PM Press, 2010); Judith Suissa, Anarchism and Education: A Philosophical Perspective
(Oakland, CA: PM Press, 2006); and Leonard I. Krimerman and Lewis Perry, eds., Patterns of Anarchy: A
Collection of Writings on the Anarchist Tradition (New York: Doubleday, 1966).
20. Paul Goodman, The Paul Goodman Reader (New York: PM Press, 2011); George Dennison, The
Lives of Children: The Story of the First Street School (New York: Random House, 1970); and A. S. Neill,
Summerhill: A Radical Approach to Child Rearing (New York: Macmillan, 1960).
21. Susan F. Semel and Alan R. Sadovnik, “Schools of Tomorrow,” Schools of Today: What Happened
to Progressive Education (New York: Peter Lang, 1999).
22. For a fascinating account of which, see Sol Cohen, “In the Name of the Prevention of Psychosis: The
Search for Psychoanalytic Pedagogy in Europe, 1905–1935,” in Regulated Children/Liberated Children:
Education in Psycho-Historical Perspective, ed. Barbara Finkelstein (New York: Psychohistory Press,
1979), 184–219.
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Those principles and practices closest to skholé — based on the recognition of
the agentic nature of childhood and of school as a space and time of encounter —
although present in all but the dominant “social engineering” approach, can be
found most clearly articulated in the democratic school movement inaugurated
by A. S. Neill’s Summerhill; in the English anarcho-socialist thought of William
Morris and Herbert Read; and in Celestin Freinet’s Modern School Movement,
which combined inquiry-based cooperative learning with self-determination and
democratic self-government. As opposed to the others, which have their roots in
nineteenth-century socializing mode theory, these are twentieth-century movements, radicalized by the clear onset of the empathic mode and the bitter “civics”
lessons of the First World War. Presaged as the “century of the child” in 1900,23
the twentieth century saw a steady increase in educational ventures organized on
the principle of dialogue.
Monological schooling, on the other hand, is organized — in its construction
of built space, human grouping, organization of knowledge and learning materials,
communication (pedagogy), and governance (the exercise of power) — around
the intrusive mode of child rearing, originally formulated in Aristotle’s deficit
theory of childhood, and it is based on principles of coercion in the interests of
“formation,” whether understood as “breaking” or “instilling” or “disciplining”;
or “behavioral change”; or “banking”; or even “shaping” or “guiding,” which is
the chief characteristic of the socializing mode, and which also invokes Aristotle’s
teleological theory of development. Above all, “formation” in this sense is — in
its original and enduring association with nation-state and corporate hegemony,
under the sign of a form of temporality (kronos) that frames educational activity as economic, that is, as instrumental “work” in the interest of production
not just of subjectivities (in the form of habits, skills, dispositions, and beliefs),
but of the future (in the form of jobs, “personalities,” lifestyles, indexes, and
income levels) — the production of productivity as a dominant ideology. The
criticism, expressed regularly by educational theorists from Dewey on,24 that
state- and corporate-controlled education represents the most glaring example
of cultural lag can be attributed to a fundamental patriarchal conservatism in
the adult–child relation, which is articulated in the Aristotelian ontological subor pseudo-speciation of childhood. Universal, state-sponsored, bureaucratized
schooling understands itself as an apparatus for the formation of one generation by
another — the exercise of task, routine, and standardized, normalized expectations,
a disciplinary structure imposed by adults in the interest of turning children into
images of themselves and their world. Here “school” is implicitly understood as
an adult colonial outpost in the aboriginal world of childhood. In Dewey’s words,
Adults have given training rather than education. An impatient, premature mechanization
of impulsive activity after the fixed pattern of adult habits of thought and affection has
23. Juliet Kinchin and Adrian O’Connor, Century of the Child: Growing by Design, 1900–2000 (New
York: The Museum of Modern Art, 2012.)
24. John Dewey, The School and Society (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1900).
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been desired. The combined effect of love of power, timidity in the face of the novel and a
self-admiring complacency has been too strong to permit immature impulse to exercise its
reorganizing potentialities.25

It is to these “reorganizing potentialities” that skholé is dedicated, under the
sign of aion, time liberated from linearity (free time, present time), and kairos, the
time of emergence, of interruption of the everyday time of production that sacrifices the present for a calculated future.26 These are the form of lived time that we
often associate with childhood. As Dewey suggests in the preceding quote, education (as opposed to training) becomes possible in social institutions when the
powers of childhood are recognized and given their due, which in turn becomes
possible, as deMause argues, when there is a widespread — albeit never universal
— collective shift in psychogenic mode. The “closer approaches” between adults
and children that deMause identifies as a historical process of dialectical change
are based, according to him, on a withdrawal of psychological projection: the adult
no longer sees — or more accurately, comes to mistrust and resist — his or her
own repressed and split-off shadow material as it appears on the blank screen of
the child, and recognizes the latter as a singularity rather than an example of a
type, and as an agent of his or her own growth and transformation — in short, as
inherently reasonable, in the sense of sharing an interlocutive lifeworld characterized by species-specific communicative rationality, from whatever age. In the
wake of this shift in cultural perception, the political ideology of participatory
democracy replaces hierarchy, and a belief — bolstered by organismic theory, complexity theory, ethology, and evolutionary psychology — in both individual and
social self-regulation replaces “discipline.” A constructivist epistemology replaces
infusion or transmission pedagogy with a pedagogy of emergence and autopoesis.
Play replaces production; experience replaces preparation for experience; growth
replaces formation; and authority based on power-over is replaced by power-with.

Neoteny, Paedomorphism, and SKHOLÉ
Like all intentional communities, school as skholé aspires to be, after Dewey,
an “embryonic society” — or, more specifically, an “embryonic democratic community.”27 The intentional community called “school” is dedicated to the possibilities inherent in the phenomenon of neoteny, the extraordinarily long childhood
of our species; and in paedomorphism, or the retention of childlike characteristics
throughout the human life cycle, including what Dewey counted as the great virtue
of childhood, “plasticity.”28 The archetype of skholé embodies a form of gathering
and action that facilitates the paedomorphic impulse — the impulse to interrupt,
25. Dewey, Human Nature and Conduct, 96.
26. In On Study, Tyson Lewis has distinguished between “bureaucratic,” “prophetic,” and “messianic”
time in education; he critiques the first and second in the interest of the third (95–97) in a comparison
that does not, in my view, affect an understanding of the temporality of skholé.
27. Sorel and Navodnik, “Schools of Tomorrow,” Schools of Today, 367.
28. Stephen Jay Gould, Ontogeny and Phylogeny (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1977);
Ashley Montagu, Growing Young, 2nd ed. (Westport, CT: Bergin & Garvey, 1989); Bjorklund, “The

281

282

EDUCATIONAL THEORY

Volume 67

Number 3

2017

invent, transform, create, cooperate, love, and collectively thrive — that is one
psychohistorical driver of cultural and social evolution.29 A phenomenology of the
archetype — that is, a description of its appearance in the human social world —
identifies it as a spontaneous expression of the adult–child relation in the form of
an encounter that brings into practical focus what Paulo Freire has called “humanization,” or our “ontological vocation to become more human” that is based on
the understanding that we are “unfinished,” which in turn implies the “transformational character of reality.”30 Skholé is a form of gathering that allows what
Hannah Arendt identified as “natality” its transformational power through the
affirmation of a culture of psychological paedomorphism. Evolutionary psychologist Ashley Montagu identified the adaptive characteristics of paedomorphism as
“curiosity, playfulness, affection, sociality, and an innate desire to cooperate.”31
Although each of these concepts — plasticity, neoteny, paedomorphism, humanization, unfinishedness, and natality — can be said to include its others, the last
most clearly marks the possibilities inherent in human difference and singularity. If, as Arendt argues, each birth signals the appearance of something “uniquely
new” in the world, we must create the conditions necessary for each unique being
to “disclose itself,” and doing so holds promise for the founding of a new political
space, a public space where “freedom can appear as a worldly reality.”32
While monological schooling is dedicated to the (re)production of calculated, pre-ordained outcomes (whether test scores, skills, dispositions, workers,
consumers, “citizens,” or even “self-actualized” persons), skholé, as a form of
dialogical gathering and action, is dedicated to emergent inquiry, individually,
collaboratively, and sometimes collectively undertaken. More broadly and however implicitly, it is dedicated to the possibilities for personal, cultural, and social
reconstruction that follow from an educative relationship between adults and children that is based on understanding children as bearers of the novel, a notion that
Dewey evokes through his faith in the “reorganizing potentialities” of the “immature impulse” of child life. Impulses, in Dewey’s vocabulary, are “the pivots upon
which the re-organization of activities turn, they are agencies of deviation, for giving new directions to old habits and changing their quality.”33 As a paedomorphic
as opposed to a gerontomorphic institution, skholé is an evolutionary outpost, that
is, a site of intergenerational dialogue in which the dialectical relation between
impulse and habit is explored by means of practices that encourage emergent
forms of (1) individual and social subjectivity; (2) work, play, and interaction;
Role of Immaturity in Human Development”; and John Dewey, Democracy and Education (New York:
Macmillan, 1916).
29. Montagu, Growing Young.
30. Paulo Freire, Pedagogy of the Oppressed (New York: Continuum, 1970).
31. Montagu, Growing Young, 107.
32. Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1958), 17.
33. Dewey, Human Nature and Conduct, 93.
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and (3) connections between epistemological domains. These emergent forms
ultimately yield new forms of production that are taken back into the world of
kronos and that then act to interrupt, disrupt, and transform that world.
It is important to keep in mind that the child–adult binary is a contrastive
pair, and that the two terms are inseparable. To problematize and reconstruct the
concept “child” necessarily implies the reconstruction of “adult.” When Dewey
invokes the Hobbesian catalogue of adult failings of “love of power, timidity
in the face of the novel and a self-admiring complacency,” he identifies them
as sins against childhood — that is, against the “reorganizing potentialities” of
childhood impulse in its encounter with adult habit. This implies that if these
impulses are, in his words, “permitted” to enter dialogue with adult habit, both are
transformed, with the ongoing pragmatic result, as Dewey phrases it, of “steady
re-organization of customs and institutions” in the interest of “a future new
society of changed purposes and desires.”34 This possibility of a transformative
encounter between impulse and habit has its material analogue in the biology of
neoteny theory, which is the evolutionary basis for the archetype of skholé. The
extraordinarily long childhood of the human species is made necessary by the fact
that neurons in the frontal lobe are organized more densely in the human brain
than in other animal brains, and that different brain regions such as the amygdala
and temporal lobes, which are involved in emotion and forming memories, are
more complex in humans than in other species. Human intelligence is linked to
increasingly advanced networks of brain activation and to multiple connections
between different neural regions.35
The human brain takes roughly twenty-five years to develop completely
(about one-third of the average human life span), and most significantly for education, it is composed of a combination of “experience-expectant” and “experiencedependent” neurons. The former term, we are told, refers to “incorporation of
environmental information that is ubiquitous in the environment and common
to all species members” — that is, to universal human functions in normal patterns of development. The latter term refers to “incorporation of environmental
information that is idiosyncratic, or unique to the individual. … [T]he neural basis
of experience-dependent processes appears to involve active formation of new
synaptic connections in response to the events providing the information to be
stored.”36 In other words, the individual’s interaction with his or her environment
fosters specific new brain growth and refines existing brain structures, influencing
neural connections uniquely in different individuals. Although neural plasticity —
the ability of the brain to modify itself and adapt to challenges of the environment
— is increasingly understood to be present throughout the life cycle, during
34. Ibid., 100, 96.
35. Joseph Chilton Pearce, The Biology of Transcendence (Rochester, VT: Park Street Press, 2002).
36. William T. Greenough, James E. Black, and Christopher S. Wallace, “Experience and Brain Development,” Child Development 58, no. 3 (1987): 539–559.

283

284

EDUCATIONAL THEORY

Volume 67

Number 3

2017

human childhood an overabundance of neurons are in process of being organized
through experience into individualized synaptic connecting patterns, grids, and
relationships. If the latter are not, through use, permanently “insulated” by myelination into neural circuits, they undergo a periodic neurochemical “pruning”;
thus, connections that are used become strengthened and survive while unused
connections are replaced by different pathways or disappear.37
Skholé, then, is the institution dedicated to the evolutionary possibilities
of neoteny to the extent that it provides a rich, brain-friendly environment
designed to meet the urge for novelty, the preference for social stimulation, and
the heightened attention to sensory experience that we associate with childhood.
It is implicitly dedicated to the paedomorphic evolutionary project, which we may
characterize — with both strong and weak utopian theory, including anarchism
and Deweyan pragmatism — as creating spaces that encourage the emergence of
new forms of sensibility; in psychoneural parlance, this means creating the best
environments for the development of more adaptive connections between the
brain’s cognitive, aesthetic, and emotional regions. By “best” I mean those environments that encourage forms of subjectivity that improve intelligence, which I
understand as a style of adaptation that, in Dewey’s formulation, makes possible
“a release of capacities that have not previously functioned,” which through a
process of “continuous reconstruction” undergo “a steady reorganization of habits
to meet new elements in new situations,” and through “a new distribution of
energies which have henceforth to be employed in ways for which past experience
gives no exact instruction” leads to the formation of “habits … which are more
intelligent, more sensitively percipient, more informed with foresight, more aware
of what they are about, more direct and sincere, more flexibly responsive than
those now current,” all in the interest of “a future new society of changed purposes
and desires.”38 Skholé may be thought of as one laboratory of this evolutionary
project; a relatively new one in species history, but one that has always been an
implicit dimension of the adult–child relation. Historically, we find the first normative inquiry into and analysis of this dimension in Dewey’s earliest works on
schooling — in the laboratory school that he and his wife founded at the University
of Chicago in 1896, and in the cooperative research he and his daughter conducted
on six exemplary schools, published as Schools of Tomorrow in 1915.39 We also
find skholé in emergent form in the history, roughly contemporary with Dewey, of
libertarian anarchist schooling. The most well-known and longest-lasting school
established in conjunction with this movement, Summerhill (founded in 1921),
37. Ross A. Thompson, “Development in the First Years of Life,” Caring for Infants and Toddlers 11,
no. 1 (2001): 21–33.
38. Dewey, Human Nature and Conduct, passim: 284, 101, 104, 285, 128, and 96.
39. John Dewey and Evelyn Dewey, Schools of Tomorrow (Boston: E. P. Dutton, 1915).
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had a profound influence on the emergence of the “free school” in the 1960s, and
its influence can still be seen in the worldwide democratic education movement.40

Phenomenology of SKHOLÉ
As already stated, the archetype of skholé is characterized by a suspension
of the “natural” order. It is a place apart, dedicated to the nonproductive, or
“free” and emergent, temporality of aion and kairos. It is a transitional space,
like the theater, art studio, or other settings for deep play — a psychological
space in which the symbolic boundaries between inner and outer, subject and
object, real and imaginary, possible and impossible, self and other, dream and
reality are provisionally tested. As such, the primary curriculum of skholé is
centered on aesthetic inquiry, the human activity in which those boundaries are
most visible and often called into question. The transitional is the psychological
and social space of creativity, interruption, and innovation, and of intrinsically
motivated inquiry of all kinds — scientific and philosophical as well as artistic
and interpersonal. It is the epistemological space from which new paradigms arise,
and new ontologies are considered. In a paedomorphic culture, it is the space of
inquiry that leads to transformation and reconstruction, and to the form of joint
communicative inquiry and action that Dewey identified as social democracy.41
In its transitionality, skholé is a complex poietic42 intentional space, in
which the long-recognized psychodynamic characteristics of play — self-regulating
arousal modulation and drive reduction, moderate complexity, discovery, intrinsic
competence and mastery motivation, the primacy of the nonliteral and representational — constitute the basis for a theory of self-organizing learning and of a
dialogical pedagogical approach. Deep play — play that dissolves the conventional
work/play dichotomy — is an aionic activity, in which time is experienced as presence (parousia) and immediacy, as opposed to an external metric driving or dragging
me forward, waiting for me, demanding a predetermined product of my time. The
artifacts that result from playful work — a poem, a drama, a dance, a story, a piece
of music, a model, a painting, a handcrafted object, a philosophical dialogue —
carry the symbolic resonance of kairos: lived time as the “right” time, the opportune or “appointed” moment, the time of lived completion or manifestation.
Skholé as a laboratory of the transitional has several other neotenic
brain-friendly environmental features. As an open structure, it is characterized by richness, variety, and emergent order in the communicative organization
of space, of stimuli, and of activities; in the balance between individual and group
experience and the balance between teacher and student initiative; in the forms
40. Neill, Summerhill; Avrich, The Modern School Movement; Herbert Read, Education through
Art (London: Faber and Faber, 1955); and International Democratic Education Network, www.
idenetwork.org.
41. Dewey, Democracy and Education, 87.
42. In the sense of the original Greek term “making,” that is, in the form of an action that transforms
oneself and the world.
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of problem solving applied to the emergence of conflict within the social system;
and in the praxis of communal governance that approaches democracy as a form of
collective problem solving. Skholé is multisensorial; in other words, it is stocked
with materials and activities that engage all the senses. It is also polysymbolic in
the sense that it offers activities and projects that call on all of the “one hundred
languages” of representation: verbal, written, and symbolic language; imaging in
various forms; the shaping of things (sculpture, craft); mime and movement; and
music. Aesthetic experience is the curricular ground of skholé and is its primary
form of action, that which is most closely connected to the sensible body, and the
most natural of the disciplines in that it is, as Herbert Read argued, “a discipline
imposed by the tool and the material.”43
As a space of child–adult encounter, three principles of dialogue are primary:
maintaining a fundamental respect for the other as a singularity, practicing a balance or mutuality of power, and an openness to being changed through interaction
with the other.44 In his analysis of the dialectical relation between impulse and
habit, Dewey understands the latter as broad patterns of action and reaction, of
belief, attitude, and judgment. Habits, in his words, are “affections” with “projectile power,” “predispositions,” “demands for certain kinds of activity,” which
“constitute the self” and which, “in any intelligible sense of the word will, … are
will.”45 Habit is tested, exercised, and transformed by the vital, spontaneous, emergent active or reactive energy of immediate impulse in response to the manifold
stimuli in each situation. Impulse — which Dewey in one place calls the child’s
“vital logical movement,”46 which he sometimes calls “instinct,” and which we
may associate with “interest” or “desire” — interrupts, challenges, and vivifies
habit, and transforms it such that, ideally, it becomes “an expansion of power[,] not
its shrinkage.”47 Herbert Marcuse invokes a similar evolutionary dialectic when
he speaks of the historical emergence of a “new sensibility” through the “reconstruction of experience,” which would “find expression in the transformation of
43. Herbert Read, The Grass Roots of Art: Lectures on the Social Aspects of Art in an Industrial Age
(London: Faber and Faber, 1955).
44. In his essay “Education,” Martin Buber provides an analysis of what he calls a relationship of
dialogical “inclusion,” arguing that in child–adult dialogue, the adult assumes the existence in the child
of those powers of self-initiation, self organization, and self-regulation — the existence, that is, of a
natural, biologically-based “reason” — which she as an adult also assumes in herself. Martin Buber,
“Education,” in Between Man and Man, trans. R. G. Smith (New York: Macmillan, 1965), 115–120. For
a further elaboration of this concept, see Kennedy, The Well of Being, 159.
45. Dewey, Human Nature and Conduct, 25.
46. John Dewey, How We Think, in John Dewey: The Later Works, 1925–1953. vol. 8, ed. Jo Ann
Boydston (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1983), 179.
47. Dewey, Human Nature and Conduct, 93.
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the Lebenswelt,” marked by “the appearance of new instinctual needs and values”
that make authentic democratic character and practice possible.48
As appropriate to a site dedicated to the dialogical encounter between the
child’s “vital logical movement” of inquiry and the adult’s storehouse of cultural memory or logic of the disciplines (that is, the codified results of previous
inquiry), the curriculum of skholé is emergent: children’s interests49 are met by
adults in the form of activities, projects, and courses of study — designed, depending on circumstances, for individuals or small or large groups — in a thoroughly
polysemic setting. Poetry, narrative, languages, drawing, painting, sculpture, handicraft, ceramics, dance, movement, sport, song, musical improvisation, drama, theater, performance, nature study, scientific inquiry, mathematical inquiry, social
inquiry, cooking, sewing, carpentry, gardening, and communal philosophical discussion — these make up the varied palette of symbolic materials and languages.
And the teacher becomes, as in Elizabeth Jones and Gretchen Reynolds’s compelling formulation of the ludic facilitator, Planner, Stage Manager, Mediator,
Player, Interrupter, Scribe, Assessor, and Communicator.50

Communal Philosophical Inquiry and SKHOLÉ
The last of the symbolic languages named above — communal philosophical inquiry — invokes the historical emergence of skholé most directly in the
staking out of a site within the culture dedicated to an interruption of the temporality of state and economic production in the service of Platonic theoria —
beholding or contemplating through the “eye of the mind” or noesis, a process
that is secularized, democratized, and operationalized in the Socratic elenchus. In
skholé the post-Socratic communal discussion functions as an ur-discourse. It provides a vehicle both for the interruption and problematization of epistemological
and ontological habits of belief that underlie the disciplines — history, sociology,
psychology, anthropology, and so on — and for the everyday ethical and juridical
praxis of the school community. The former is perhaps the most direct expression
of the shift from gerontomorphic to paedomorphic education that skholé represents: the primacy of the question replaces the primacy of the answer or statement.
The original questions to which the disciplines are a set of answers are excavated
through philosophical questioning, and explored through group dialogue, in the
implicit interest of ongoing conceptual reconstruction.
Questions that interrogate common, central, contestable concepts — such as
alive, human, animal, justice, self, god, cause, duty, freedom, possibility, peace,
48. Herbert Marcuse, An Essay on Liberation (Boston: Beacon Press, 45). See also David Kennedy,
“Neoteny, Dialogic Education, and an Emergent Psychoculture: Notes on Theory and Practice,” Journal
of Philosophy of Education 48, no. 1 (2014): 100–117.
49. In The School and Society, Dewey speaks of children’s impulses/interests as “instincts,” of which
he identifies four: construction, communication, investigation, and expression.
50. Elizabeth Jones and Gretchen Reynolds, The Play’s the Thing: Teachers’ Roles in Children’s Play
(New York: Teachers College Press, 1992).
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mind, nature, culture, society, language, evil, love, and so on — implicitly explore
the boundaries of the paradigms we live by; as such, interrogation of these concepts
in philosophical dialogue is potentially (and never perfectly) a form of interruption
of the world of contingent, implicit, and unconscious norms that is analogous
to the interruption of the perceptual world represented by art. The space of the
philosophical circle is transitional in the same way as the experience of art,
although the material of the former is linguistic and conceptual. What sets it apart
from other forms of transitional space, however, is its connection with the ethical
— with the question “What shall we then do?” that implicitly connects it with
action, thus bringing us back to the second role of group inquiry: its function
as juridical praxis in the intentional community of skholé. The circle that is a
setting for philosophical inquiry into the paradigmatic beliefs that make up the
disciplines is also a circle for practical problem solving within the democratic
community, which is always emergent and never free of problems, both great
and small. The inquiry circle is where issues of governance — which involve
shifting balances and imbalances of power on every level, conflict, transgression,
violation, and consequence — are raised and worked through. Rules are made,
challenged, changed, and, in some cases, thrown out; complaints are aired and
resolved; plans are made.51 Here, at least two of the basic building blocks of the
democratic social character — a capacity for dialogue and a tolerance for ambiguity
— are laid and practiced, as well as habits of direct democratic action, in which
participation in governance on the micro and macro levels is understood as an
existential requirement. The dialogical circle is the heart of skholé as a place apart
and a community of reflection, theory, belief, speech, and action; it is a perennially
unfinished version of the ideal speech community, in which we both theorize
theory and practice justice, or Platonic dikaiosune.

Conclusion: Childhood, Paedomorphism, and Paradigm Shift
As an archetype, skholé is a constant possibility in the human community
of adult–child relations, but it is also a historical invention. It emerges at times
and in circumstances that allow or require it, and it appears in different forms,
although its fundamental morphology as a form of “gathering and action,” “suspension of the natural order,” “suspending the urgency of the moment,” “opening a
future,” and open-ended, emergent study52 is always recognizable. As an evolutionary gambit, it comes “to bring not peace but a sword” in the sense that it disrupts
and transforms, and represents the imminence of paradigm shift in a given culture.53 It was made possible in our time when “child” entered Western history as
51. For existing models of this practice in schools associated with the Democratic Schools Movement,
see https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Democratic_education.
52. Masschelein and Simons, In Defense of Schools, passim.
53. In an analogous account, David F. Lancy, in The Anthropology of Childhood: Cherubs, Chattel,
Changelings (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), offers an ethnographic description of the
advent of the “village school” in premodern societies, which frequently became a site of cultural conflict,

Kennedy

An Archetypal Phenomenology of Skholé

interlocutor rather than as “cherub, chattel, or changeling,”54 and has appeared in
the guise of various educational approaches (including anarchist, libertarian, and
progressive) since the early nineteenth century, albeit in differing ideological registers. There is not sufficient space here to take up the question of skholé’s influence
on mainstream conventional education, or the related question of whether it can
survive in any form — for example, in an individual teacher’s classroom within a
school and a system otherwise devoted to the “impatient, premature mechanization of impulsive activity after the fixed pattern of adult habits” implicit in the
high-surveillance, “result-oriented,” hypercompetitive, standardized, and monetized climate of mainstream education today.
Another, related issue is associated with the concrete material requirements
necessary to support the emergence of skholé in time, space, and culture. Are there
limits, for instance, on school size and teacher–student ratio beyond which the
archetype cannot manifest? How profoundly does school architecture influence the
realization of a “space that is … detached and separated from the time and space
of both the society and the household”?55 What — in an age of ever-increasing,
whole-planet intervisibility, in which billions of us are involuntarily complicit in
systems that pose dramatic challenges to sustainability; social welfare; human,
animal, and ecological rights; and even, ultimately, species survival — is the
responsibility of skholé as “embryonic society” to bear witness and to take action
of some kind in local and global communities?
Finally, I would suggest that the entry of child into history as an interlocutor
with adult — to the extent that this psychohistorical movement is associated with
the broad emergence of cultural paedomorphism — promises not just a humanizing
or “civilizing” influence on adult societies, but a reanimating influence on adult
epistemological and ontological discourses. As for the first of these influences, to
the extent that a more consciously paedomorphic culture values the childlike traits
identified by Montagu — “curiosity, wonder, playfulness, imagination, creativity,
open-mindedness, flexibility, experimental-mindedness, explorativeness”56 — the
more intelligent that culture is and the greater its capacity for evolutionary
adaptation: for dealing with, to repeat Dewey’s classic phrase, situations for
which “past experience gives no exact instruction,” and for developing “habits
… which are more intelligent, more sensitively percipient, more informed with
foresight, more aware of what they are about, more direct and sincere, more flexibly
responsive than those now current.”57 This assumes that our paedomorphic traits
are the cognitive and emotional engines of cultural evolution.
and an early historical example of how school is “the way in which a society puts itself at a distance from
itself” (Masschelein and Simons, In Defense of the School, 183).
54. Lancy, The Anthropology of Childhood; and Kennedy, The Well of Being.
55. Masschelein and Simons, In Defense of the School, 181.
56. Montagu, Growing Young, 107.
57. Dewey, Human Nature and Conduct, 285, 128.
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Second, psychological paedomorphism suggests an openness to difference
and singularity — that is, to natality — and a psychosomatic grounding in
what Marcuse called “sensuous reason,”58 which he considered a mark of the
emergent sensibility his work explored. Recent ontological discourses, which
revisit historical notions of animism and vitalism in search of an expanded notion
— and one that is in fact truer to experience — of “life,” “living,” and the
agentic characteristics of matter,59 suggest a new reading of those characteristics
of young children’s perceptual reasoning that Jean Piaget explored a century
ago in his book The Child’s Conception of the World.60 Here, following the
dominant interpretation, Piaget identified these characteristics with the thought
of “primitives” and the mentally ill. In the age of the Anthropocene and the Sixth
Extinction, the influence of children’s epistemological and ontological persuasions
and the communicative rationality associated with childhood (for example, belief
in the capacity for interspecies recognition and communication) could be seen
as prophetic elements in the emergence of the paradigm change upon which
ecological survival may depend. We may, in fact, interpret every paradigm shift
as an expression of natality and an assertion of paedomorphic intelligence. As
a laboratory for the development of this form of intelligence, skholé is one
institution that can save us.

58. Herbert Marcuse, Eros and Civilization: A Philosophical Inquiry into Freud (Boston: Beacon Press,
1955), 148.
59. Jane Bennett, Vibrant Matter: A Political Ecology of Things (Durham, NC: Duke University Press,
2009); Diana Coole and Samantha Frost, eds., New Materialisms: Ontology, Agency, and Politics
(Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2010); Rupert Sheldrake, A New Science of Life: The Hypothesis
of Formative Causation, 3rd ed. (Los Angeles: J. P. Tarcher, 2009); and David Skrbina, Panpsychism in
the West (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2007).
60. Jean Piaget, The Child’s Conception of the World (1929; repr. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield,
2007).

